Why Does the Cato Institute Defend Pedophiles and Hate GWB?


The Cato Institute hates George W. Bush and Lindsey Graham, but it will bend over backward to defend pedophiles.

The Pink Flamingo keeps telling you how repulsive and immoral libertarians are.  This proves it. This one hits  home.  I was talking to my mother about their defense of pedophiles.  Thank God for George W. Bush.  If this bill he signed – damning pedophiles to remain in prison – had been in effect when I was a child, I WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN MOLESTED by the pedophile who was released from prison because he had served his debt to society.

I find myself screaming when I read some of the self-righteous libertarian shit these so-called guardians of liberty are spewing.  Do people like this possess any human decency?

The SCOTUS upheld the Comstock ruling – thank heavens. Sexual predators may be held in prison, indefinitely – thereby protecting innocent children everywhere. The Cato Institute blames George W. Bush for protecting the innocence of children and damning preditory pedophiles to prison.


Further, I hope the good people at the Cato Institute roast in hell for this one.

“...In his opinion today in United States v. Comstock, Justice Breyer gives us a textbook example of how the Supreme Court, over the years, has converted the Constitution into modern “constitutional law,” which is connected to the Constitution only occasionally. This is policy trumping law, pure and simple….”

Let’s put it this way.  If the person who had molested me had been required to remain in prison instead of being a predator, going after innocent children, I may have been same.

If this is what libertarians believe, I find them disgusting, repulsive, despicable, and dangerous.  NOTHING is more important than protecting innocent children from pedophiles.  I guess you just want to give us a legal joint and tell us to chill.

What mind-set would defend a pedophile?  These people cannot be rehabilitated.  It is a life-long thing with them.   This one hits home with me.  Any person who would defend these people, who think they have a right to roam free and damn more innocent children to a life-long journey through hell is almost as sick as they are.  I lump the Cato Institute right up there with them.

I have had problems with the Cato Institute for years.  I detest they way they have hammered Lindsey Graham, going after him, turning their libertarian wolves on him when he does what is right.  They have slammed George W. Bush.  They have lied about their candidates and have done their best to destroy the GOP.  THEY HAVE NO MORALITY.

But – you ought to hear the Cato Institute (libertarian) take on it.

“...An atrocious ruling from the Supreme Court yesterday in United States v. Comstock, as has been noted. It is no real surprise that the liberals on the Court ruled the way they did. They believe in big government and need a way to get around a Constitution that set up a federal government of limited and enumerated powers. Thus, we are told a “living” Constitution “evolves” in such a way as to accomodate the administrative state that is all around us. But the law at issue in the Comstock case did not arise during the Clinton years. The Adam Walsh Child Protection Act was championed by conservative legislators in the Congress and signed by Bush….”


No. 08–1224.    Argued January 12, 2010—Decided May 17, 2010
Federal law allows a district court to order the civil commitment of a mentally ill, sexually dangerous federal prisoner beyond the date he would otherwise be released. 18 U. S. C. §4248. The Government in- stituted civil-commitment proceedings under §4248 against respon- dents, each of whom moved to dismiss on the ground, inter alia, that, in enacting the statute, Congress exceeded its powers under the Nec- essary and Proper Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 18. Agreeing, the District Court granted dismissal, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed on the legislative-power ground.

Held: The Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress authority suf- ficient to enact §4248. Taken together, five considerations compel this conclusion. Pp. 5–22.
(1) The Clause grants Congress broad authority to pass laws in fur- therance of its constitutionally enumerated powers. It makes clear that grants of specific federal legislative authority are accompanied by broad power to enact laws that are “convenient, or useful” or “con- ducive” to the enumerated power’s “beneficial exercise,” e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 413, 418, and that Congress can “legislate on that vast mass of incidental powers which must be involved in the constitution,” id., at 421. In determining whether the Clause authorizes a particular federal statute, there must be “means- ends rationality” between the enacted statute and the source of fed- eral power. Sabri v. United States, 541 U. S. 600, 605. The Constitu- tion “addresse[s]” the “choice of means” “primarily . . . to the judg- ment of Congress. If it can be seen that the means adopted are really calculated to attain the end, the degree of their necessity, the extent to which they conduce to the end, the closeness of the relationship be- tween the means adopted and the end to be attained, are matters forcongressional determination alone.” Burroughs v. United States, 290 U. S. 534, 547–548. Thus, although the Constitution nowhere grants Congress express power to create federal crimes beyond those specifi- cally enumerated, to punish their violation, to imprison violators, to provide appropriately for those imprisoned, or to maintain the secu- rity of those who are not imprisoned but who may be affected by the federal imprisonment of others, Congress possesses broad authority to do each of those things under the Clause. Pp. 5–9.

(2) Congress has long been involved in the delivery of mental health care to federal prisoners, and has long provided for their civil commitment. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1855, 10 Stat. 682; Insanity De- fense Reform Act of 1984, 18 U. S. C. §§4241–4247. A longstanding history of related federal action does not demonstrate a statute’s con- stitutionality, see, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New York, 397 U. S. 664, 678, but can be “helpful in reviewing the substance of a congressional statutory scheme,” Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U. S. 1, 21, and, in particular, the reasonableness of the relation between the new statute and pre-existing federal interests. Section 4248 differs from earlier statutes in that it focuses directly upon persons who, due to a mental illness, are sexually dangerous. Many of these individu- als, however, were likely already subject to civil commitment under §4246, which, since 1949, has authorized the postsentence detention of federal prisoners who suffer from a mental illness and who are thereby dangerous (whether sexually or otherwise). The similarities between §4246 and §4248 demonstrate that the latter is a modest addition to a longstanding federal statutory framework. Pp. 9–14.

(3) There are sound reasons for §4248’s enactment. The Federal Government, as custodian of its prisoners, has the constitutional power to act in order to protect nearby (and other) communities from the danger such prisoners may pose. Moreover, §4248 is “reasonably adapted” to Congress’ power to act as a responsible federal custodian. United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 121. Congress could have rea- sonably concluded that federal inmates who suffer from a mental ill- ness that causes them to “have serious difficulty in refraining from sexually violent conduct,” §4247(a)(6), would pose an especially high danger to the public if released. And Congress could also have rea- sonably concluded that a reasonable number of such individuals would likely not be detained by the States if released from federal custody. Congress’ desire to address these specific challenges, taken together with its responsibilities as a federal custodian, supports the conclusion that §4248 satisfies “review for means-end rationality,” Sabri, supra, at 605. Pp. 14–16….”